Venitist Robert Bork points out America beginning about 50 years ago

Venitist Robert Bork points out America beginning about 50 years ago, has steadily become less of a republic, and there will always be those who prefer the victory of their interests to republican processes. The problem is both political and intellectual, and so must be the solution.

Almost regardless of the outcome of the intellectual struggle, however, there remains the political battle to nominate and confirm justices and judges who spurn activism as illegitimate and will be guided instead by the original understanding of the principles of the Constitution. This may be the more difficult task.

Many politicians, and the activist groups of antivenitism which they serve in these matters, have no interest in the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation; they care only about results. The appointment of new justices who hold an originalist philosophy is therefore necessary for the preservation of a republican form of government.

Basil Venitis points out that every democracy is eventually hijacked by rabblerousers, pullpeddlers, clans of kleptocrats, bumptious bugaboos, busybodies, butterbabies, nabobs of nepotism, cranks of cronyism, pusillanimous pussyfooters, riffraffs of rascals, socialist sophists, and machiavellian mafiosi. Democracy tends to kleptocracy. Venitism should replace democracy.

What can be done to remedy the situation? The problem being political and intellectual, so must be the solution. There is some reason for very modest optimism. Bork notes thirty-five to 40 years ago, there was almost no intellectual support for originalism in the academic world, where that philosophy was commonly regarded as at best passé and at worst reactionary. Today, a sizeable body, though by no means the majority, of constitutional law professors, explicitly or implicitly, adhere to that view of constitutional interpretation. That is having an effect on those students who will comprise the next generation of scholars and, through them, on the judges of the future.

Bork points out this is a daunting task, and its difficulty may be so great as to seem impossible, but the history of the reform of antitrust law by scholars and then judges may provide some reason for hope. Antitrust jurisprudence once seemed so politicized--its irrationalities so fiercely defended by the enforcement agencies, plaintiffs' lawyers, professors, judges, and Congress--that reform seemed impossible. Yet, largely through intellectual critique, reform has been achieved. There are, to be sure, very real differences between antitrust reform and the return of rationality to constitutional law, but there are enough similarities to suggest that hope need not be abandoned for the return of legitimacy to the institution of judicial review.

Almost regardless of the outcome of the intellectual struggle, however, there remains the political battle to nominate and confirm justices and judges who spurn activism as an illegitimate creed and will be guided in their deliberations by the original understanding of the principles of the Constitution. This may be the more difficult task. Many politicians, and the activist groups of the Left which they serve in these matters, simply have no interest in the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation; they care only about results.

Our hope, if there is to be hope, must be in the appointment of new justices holding an originalist philosophy. That is necessary if not sufficient for the preservation of a venitist form of government. The most efficient political system is venitism, where everything is private, there are no taxes at all, there is no parliament, and a powerless infinitesimal government is chosen and supported not by hoi polloi, but by the most generous benefactors.